

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /031 W

----- 109918

O 121400Z OCT 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2241

INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SECTIONS SALT TWO GENEVA 106

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DRAFT STATEMENT FOR NAC CONSULTATION SALT, OCTOBER 17, 1974

(SALT TWO-466)

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT STATEMENT PREPARED FOR OCTOBER 17  
NAC CONSULTATION ON SALT.

2. IN ORDER TO PERMIT USNATO TO PREPARE STATEMENT FOR  
DISTRIBUTION IN NAC, REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON'S COMMENTS OR CON-  
CURRENCE BE CABLED DIRECTLY TO US MISSION NATO TO BE RECEIVED BY  
COB OCTOBER 16, WITH INFO COPY TO USDEL SALT TWO GENENVA.

3. FYI. DELEGATION MAY WISH TO ADD TO MODIFY PROTION OF  
THIS STATEMENT DEALING WITH THE SOVIET POSITION (FROM PARA. 16  
ON) IN LIGHT OF TWO ADDITIONAL MEETINGS SCHEDULED FOR  
OCTOBER 15 AND 16. ADDITIONS OR CHANGES, IF ANY, WILL BE CABLED  
TO USNATO AND WASHINGTON BY COB GENEVA TIME OCOTOBER 16.

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STATEMENT OF SALT

TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

OCTOBER 17, 1974

1. I AM PLEASED TO MEET WITH YOU AGAIN TODAY TO CONTINUE THESE CONSULTATIONS ON SALT. AS YOU KNOW, I CONSIDER THESE CONSULTATIONS TO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND I VALUE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THE COUNCIL ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. I AM ALSO PLEASED TO NOTE THAT FOLLOWING MY PRESENTATION ON SALT, MR. SIDNEY GRAYBEAL, A FORMER MEMBER OF THE US SALT DELEGATION AND NOW THE US COMMISSIONER OF THE US-SOVIET STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (USSCC), WILL BE DESCRIBING TO YOU THE WORK OF THIS GROUP. IN ADDITION, I UNDERSTAND THERE WILL BE AN EXPERT'S MEETING IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS MORNING'S CONSULTATION AT WHICH THE US WILL BE REPRESENTED BY MR. GRAYBEAL AND BY MR. RALPH EARLE, A MEMBER OF THE US SALT DELEGATION AND FORMERLY WITH THE US MISSION HERE AT NATO.

2. SINCE THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS RECESSED IN GENEVA LAST MARCH 19, SECRETARY KISSINGER MET WITH THE COUNCIL ON JULY 4 TO DESCRIBE AT SOME LENGTH THE 1974 US/USSR SUMMIT MEETING AND TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE EXCHANGES WHICH TOOK PLACE ON SALT ISSUES. IN PASSING, I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE ABM PROTOCOL WAS SUBMITTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE SENATE ON SEPTEMBER 19 FOR ITS ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION.

3. PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER ALSO MET WITH THE NATO AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON ON AUGUST 10 AT WHICH TIME THE SECRETARY DISCUSSED BRIEFLY THE BROAD OUTLINES OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY AND INDICATED THAT THE US WAS IN THE PROCESS OF FORMULATING A SALT POSITION FOR AN AGREEMENT COVERING THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. TODAY, I WILL SUMMARIZE FOR YOU THE US POSITION AND THE DEVELOPMENTS IN SALT SINCE WE RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA ON SEPTEMBER 18.

4. AS SECRETARY KISSINGER TOLD YOU, WE HAD HOPED AT THE 1974 SUMMIT TO ACHIEVE SOME SORT OF ASYMMETRIC LIMITS WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE US TO RETAIN MORE MIRV LAUNCHERS AND WARHEADS IN EXCHANGE FOR A TWO TO THREE-YEAR EXTENSION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT (IA). ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED THIS APPROACH IN PRINCIPLE, AS SECRETARY KISSINGER INFORMED YOU, WE WERE UNABLE TO COME TO

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ANY AGREEMENT WHICH WE BELIEVED WOULD REPRESENT SOME REASONABLE CONSTRAINT ON ESTIMATED SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS.

5. AS YOU KNOW, THE DECISION WAS MADE TO ABANDON THE IDEA OF CONCLUDING A SHORT-TERM MIRV LIMITATION AGREEMENT IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN IA EXTENSION AND TO CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS ON ACHIEVING A NEW AGREEMENT COVERING THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD UNTIL 1985. IT WAS FELT THAT A TEN-YEAR PERIOD WOULD BE A BETTER TIME FRAME IN

WHICH TO IMPLEMENT REALISTIC LIMITATIONS WHICH WOULD NEITHER BE AFFECTED BY THE PRESSURE OF NEAR-TERM DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMS NOR SUBJECT TO THE UNCERTAINTIES OF TECHNOLOGY CREATED BY A LONGER-TERM COMMITMENT.

6. IT IS AGAINST THIS GENERAL BACKGROUND THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ENGAGED, SINCE LAST JULY, IN AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF ITS APPROACH TO SALT. WE CONCLUDED THAT AT THIS POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL TO ENGAGE THE SOVIET SIDE IN A THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF THE PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS WHICH MIGHT SERVE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR A 1985 AGREEMENT. THUS, I HAVE NOT ADVANCED ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AT GENEVA. RATHER, I HAVE INFORMED BY SOVIET COLLEAGUE THAT THE US VIEWS THE CURRENT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS EXPLORATORY IN NATURE AND I HAVE STRESSED US WILLINGNESS TO TAKE A "FRESH LOOK" AT THE COMPLEX ISSUES CONFRONTING THE SIDES. I HAVE ALSO NOTED THE NEW NEGOTIATING OPPORTUNITIES AFFORDED BY A FIXED TIME-FRAME, PRINCIPALLY THE FACT THAT, WHILE A 1985 AGREEMENT SHOULD FORM AN ACCEPTABLE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT, IT NEED NOT DEAL WITH ALL THE ISSUES WHICH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN PERMANENT COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT.

7. I HAVE EMPHASIZED IN GENEVA THE USG'S CONTINUED CONVICTION THAT ANY AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS MUST PROVIDE A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS -- ICBM'S, SLBM'S AND HEAVY BOMBERS. AND I HAVE STRESSED THAT THREE ELEMENTS MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN ESTABLISHING SUCH EQUIVALENCE; THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, THE OVERALL THROW-WEIGHT OF THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS AND THE LEVEL OF MIRV'ED MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS.

8. ON AGGREGATE NUMBERS, THE UNITED STATES HAS STRONGLY SUPPORTED  
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THE CONCEPT OF PHASED MUTUAL REDUCTIONS BY BOTH SIDES TO A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE COMMON LOWER LEVEL OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. AS YOU KNOW, ULTIMATELY LOWER LEVELS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS HAVE BEEN A GOAL IN SALT SINCE ITS INCEPTION AND THE US STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT REDUCTIONS CAN REVERSE THE MOMENTUM OF ARMS COMPETITION AND ENHANCE THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. THUS, IN PROPOSING THAT A COMMON LOWER LEVEL OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS BE ACHIEVED THROUGH PHASED, MUTUAL REDUCTIONS TO TAKE EFFECT DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT, I HAVE REAFFIRMED THE US COMMITMENT TO THIS GOAL AND LINKED REDUCTIONS TO THE REALISTIC 10-YEAR TIME-FRAME AGREED UPON AT THE SUMMIT.

9. YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE 1974 SUMMIT "JOINT COMMUNIQUE" AND THE "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS," SIGNED AT THE SUMMIT IN 1973,

STATED THAT AN AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SHOULD DEAL WITH LIMITATIONS ON BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ASPECT OF STRATEGIC ARMS. I HAVE REAFFIRMED TO THE SOVIET SIDE THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE US CONTINUES TO ATTACH TO LIMITING QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS COMPETITION, INCLUDING LIMITATIONS ON THE THROW-WEIGHT OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF CURRENT MIRV'S AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MIRV'S.

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /031 W

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O 121400Z OCT 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2242

INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 SECTIONS SALT TWO GENEVA 0106

EXDIS/SALT

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

10. ON CENTRAL SYSTEMS THROW-WEIGHT, I HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT AN AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDED FOR A LOWER COMMON NUMERICAL LEVEL OF STRATEGIC ARMS, BUT WHICH FAILED TO CONSTRAIN THE POTENTIAL DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF THESE WEAPONS, WOULD LEAVE UNCONTROLLED A KEY QUALITATIVE ASPECT OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. THUS, I HAVE SET FORWARD THE VIEW THAT AN AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR LIMITATIONS ON CENTRAL SYSTEMS THROW-WEIGHT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PAYLOAD OF HEAVY BOMBERS.

1. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD, HOWEVER, THAT IN DISCUSSING HEAVY BOMBER PAYLOAD, I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIET SIDE THAT, WHILE THE US ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY

OF HEAVY BOMBERS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, INCLUDING FLIGHT TIME, RECALLABILITY AND THE FACT THAT SOVIET AIR DEFENSES ARE UNCONSTRAINED, HEAVY BOMBERS CONSTITUTE A CATEGORY OF WEAPONS DIFFERENT FROM MISSILES.

12. LIMITATIONS ON THROW-WEIGHT COMPRISE ONLY ONE ASPECT OF THE QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS THE US BELIEVES ESSENTIAL

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TO CONSTRAIN IF THE SIDES ARE TO DESIGN AN EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE SALT AGREEMENT. YOU WILL RECALL THAT THROUGHOUT OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, A KEY ELEMENT OF THE US APPROACH HAS BEEN TO PRESERVE THE SURVIVABILITY OF DETERRENT FORCES AND THEREBY ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY AND REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

13. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE US HAS CONTINUALLY STRESSED THAT UNCONSTRAINED DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES COULD HAVE A POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE EFFECT OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. THUS, AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE FOR SOME TIME BEEN SEEKING TO ESTABLISH LIMITATIONS ON THIS KEY QUALITATIVE ASPECT. NOW, AS A RESULT OF THE SUMMIT DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW AND THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE ISSUE OF LIMITING MIRV'S WHICH I DESCRIBED EARLIER, THE US HAS REFINED ITS APPROACH TO MIRV LIMITATIONS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR CONCERN OVER THE LARGE THROW-WEIGHT AND THE HIGH NUMBERS OF RV'S THAT WOULD BE GENERATED BY UNCONSTRAINED DEPLOYMENT OF PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE SOVIET MIRV'ED MISSILE SYSTEMS. I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIET SIDE THAT US BELIEVES THE NEXT AGREEMENT SHOULD LIMIT THE NUMBER OF MIRV'ED MISSILE LAUNCHERS PERMITTED EACH SIDE, AND THAT ANY SUCH NUMERICAL LAUNCHER LIMITS WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THROW-WEIGHT AND NUMBER OF RE-ENTRY VEHICLES OF PERMITTED MIRV SYSTEMS.

14. YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN MY EARLIER DISCUSSION OF THE CONCLUSIONS WE HAD DRAWN FROM THE LAST SUMMIT, I MENTIONED OUR DETERMINATION NOT TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD MERELY RATIFY SOVIET MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS. AS A RESULT, I HAVE EMPHASIZED TO THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE US BELIEVES THAT A NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT CODIFY EXISTING AND PROJECTED PROGRAMS OF THE TWO SIDES, BUT MUST CONSTRAIN THE PACE AND MAGNITUDE OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS. THUS, I HAVE INDICATED THAT THE US SUPPORTS THE PRINCIPLE OF AGREED, MUTUAL AND EQUITABLE RESTRAINT IN THE MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

15. FINALLY, I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION

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THAT, WHILE THE US IS COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING AN EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE AGREEMENT AND WOULD PREFER TO DO SO AT LOWER RATHER THAN HIGHER LEVELS OF ARMAMENT, THE US STRATEGIC FORCE WILL NOT BE LESS THAN THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION, EITHER IN PERCEPTION OR REALITY. I HAVE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE LEVEL AND COMPOSITION OF US FORCES -- INCLUDING NEW SYSTEMS -- ARE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION PROVIDED THAT CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO AGREED LIMITS. IN THIS CONTEXT, I HAVE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THE CHARACTERISTICS, MAGNITUDE AND DEPLOYMENT RATE OF SOVIET STRATEGIC PROGRAMS HAVE AND WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON US PROGRAMS, US FORCE LEVELS AND, ULTIMATELY, ON LEVELS ACCEPTABLE TO THE US IN SALT.

16. THE SOVIET POSITION IN GENEVA HAS, IN ITS BROAD OUTLINE, REMAINED BASICALLY THE SAME AS IN EARLIER PHASES. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN SOME CHANGES IN EMPHASIS, TONE, AND ARGUMENTATION, WHICH APPEARS DESIGNED TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION OF SOME INCREASED FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART.

17. WITH RESPECT TO FBS, IN FORMAL STATEMENTS THE SOVIETS HAVE CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION THAT ANY NUCLEAR SYSTEM CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE IS STRATEGIC AND MUST THEREFORE BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SALT. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO REPEATED THEIR ARGUMENTS AS TO WHY NUCLEAR DELIVERY CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT, THE FORWARD BASING OF US SSBN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES AND GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS SUGGESTED REPEATEDLY IN INFORMAL CONVERSATION - AND THIS HAS BEEN BORNE OUT IN THEIR FORMAL STATEMENTS - THAT THEIR EARLIER POSITIONS ON THE PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF US FBS HAS BEEN MODIFIED.

18. IN THEIR OCTOBER 9, 1973 DRAFT AGREEMENT, YOU WILL RECALL, THE SOVIETS PROPOSED THAT NO NEW NUCLEAR BASES BE ESTABLISHED IN THIRD COUNTRIES, THAT US "FORWARD-BASED" NUCLEAR SYSTEMS BE WITHDRAWN AND THAT THEIR "CORRESPONDING BASES" LIQUIDATED WITHIN A FIVE YEAR PERIOD. THEIR DRAFT ALSO CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL BEYOND AGREED LIMITS OF SSBN'S AND CVA'S. IN THIS PHASE, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR EARLY AGREEMENT TO HALT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS FOR

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THE WITHDRAWAL OF SSBN'S AND CVA'S BEYOND AGREED LIMITS  
AND FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF FORWARD SUBMARINE BASES. AT THIS  
POINT I MIGHT ADD THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO ARGUED --  
AS THEY DID IN THE FIRST PHASE OF SALT TWO -- THAT SINCE  
SIRCRAFT CARRIERS ARE MOBILE STRATEGIC PLATFORMS THEIR  
NUCLEAR DELIVERY SIRCRAFT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS "STRATEGIC  
AVIATION" WHEREVER THEY MAY BE LOCATED.

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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O 121400Z OCT 74

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2243

INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 SECTIONS SALT TWO GENEVA 0106

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

19. THE MAIN ELEMENT OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE CURRENT SOVIET FBS  
POSITION HAS BEEN TO DOWNPLAY THE TIME-FACTOR IN THEIR  
"RADICAL" SOLUTION TO FBS AND TO INDICATE READINESS "TO CONSIDER  
VARIANTS FOR ACCOMPLISHING, ALL AT ONCE OR IN STAGES, THE  
WITHDRAWAL OF FBS, THEY HAVE NOTED THAT THE NEW 1985 TIME-  
FRAME "OFFERS NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSIDERING (SUCH)  
VARIANTS" AND THAT THESE VARIANTS WOULD THEN BE "TAKEN INTO  
ACCOUNT IN WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT."

20. I DO NOT BELIEVE, NOR DO I WISH TO LEAD THE COUNCIL TO  
BELIEVE, THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS IN SOME DEMONSTRABLE MANNER  
FALLEN OFF ITS DEMANDS REGARDING FBS. RATHER, THEY APPEAR TO HAVE  
SHIFTED FROM ASKING FOR NEAR-TERM WITHDRAWAL AND LONG-TERM  
COMPENSATION TO WHAT THEY MAY FEEL IS A MORE "REALISTIC"

DEMAND FOR LONG-TERM WITHDRAWAL AND, PRESUMABLY, NEAR-TERM COMPENSATION.

21. I HAVE RESISTED CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM MY SOVIET COUNTERPART TO ENGAGE IN AN EXTENDED DIALOGUE OVER THE FBS ISSUE, AND I HAVE SIMPLY AND REPEATEDLY REAFFIRMED TO HIM THE US VIEW THAT MUTUAL ASSURANCES CONCERNING NON-CIRCUMVENTION  
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PROVIDE A SUITABLE BASIS FOR DEALING WITH THE NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS OF BOTH SIDES.

2. ANOTHER SOVIET POSITION WAS MODIFIED SOMEWHAT AT THIS SESSION, NAMELY THEIR PROPOSAL TO BAN CERTAIN TYPES OF STRATEGIC ARMS AND TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS TO EXERCISE "MUTUAL RESTRAINT" IN DEVELOPING FUTURE SYSTEMS. THE SOVIET OCTOBER 9 DRAFT AGREEMENT CALLED FOR A BAN ON NEW-GENERATION SSBN'S, NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS, LONG-RANGE (I.E., OVER 600 KMS) AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, INTERCONTINENTAL CRUISE MISSILES, SEA-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES, STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES ON AIRBORNE PLATFORMS AND ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES (OTHER THAN SUBMARINES), AND ON FIXED OR MOBILE DEVICES FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC MISSILES, WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED OR COULD MOVE ON THE SEABED OR OCEAN FLOOR.

23. THE CURRENT LIST OF WEAPONS TO BE BANNED OMITTS THE FIRST TWO ITEMS, I.E., NEW-GENERATION SSBN'S AND NEW STRATEGIC BOMBERS, BUT ADDS TO THE REMAINING FIVE CATEGORIES A BAN ON "STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES OF THE MANEUVERABLE TYPE AND THOSE WITH GROUND TARGET HOMING," (I.E., MARV'S).

24. AS THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITION HAS EVOLVED, THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW GENERATION SUBMARINES AND NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO MUTUAL RESTRAINT RATHER THAN BANNED. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THAT "MAXIMUM RESTRAINT IN THE FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC ARMS COULD CONSTITUTE ONE OF THE BASES OF THE NEW AGREEMENT." SUCH RESTRAINT "MUST BE SPECIFICALLY EMBODIED IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT," SHOULD "TAKE INTO ACCOUNT" THE TIME-FRAME OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, AND MUST BE EXERCISED "BOTH IN TERMS OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS."

25. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ALSO REPEATED ITS EARLIER PROPOSAL THAT THE SIDES EXERCISE RESTRAINT WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC ARMS DURING THE PERIOD ON NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE MAIN MODIFICATION IN THE SOVIET POSITION HAS BEEN ON THE ONE HAND, THE SHIFT OF NEW SSBN'S AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS FROM THE "BAN" TO THE "RESTRAIN" CATEGORY AND ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CALL FOR EMBODYING IN AN AGREEMENT SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON MAXIMUM



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RESTRAINT ON THE FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

26. ON MIRV'S THE SOVIET SIDE HAS BASICALLY REPEATED THEIR FORMULATION OF LAST OCTOBER WHICH CALLED FOR LIMITS ON MIRV'ED LAUNCHERS AT "A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE AGGREGATE LEVELS ESTABLISHED" BY THE AGREEMENT. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, THREE MODIFICATIONS TO THIS FORMULATION WHICH ARE OF INTEREST. FIRST, THE MIRV'ED "PORTION" OF THE AGGREGATE IS NOW EXPRESSED "IN PERCENT," (ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THIS PERCENTAGE IS EQUAL OR NOT HAS BEEN LEFT OPEN). SECOND, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS, FOR THE FIRST TIME, FORMALLY OPPOSED PLACING ANY SUB-LIMITS ON MIRV'ED SYSTEMS. THEY HAVE EXPLICITLY PROPOSED THAT EACH SIDE HAVE THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH "AT ITS OWN DISCRETION" THE RATIO OF ICBM'S TO SLBM'S IN ITS MIRV'ED FORCE.

27. THE THIRD ASPECT OF THE CURRENT SOVIET MIRV POSITION WHICH I WANT TO NOTE IS A PROPOSAL "TO EQUATE" STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A CERTAIN NUMBER OF MIRV'ED MISSILES. FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, INCLUDING THOSE I CITED EARLIER IN CONNECTION WITH MY DISCUSSION OF THE US PROPOSAL ON THROW-WEIGHT LIMITATIONS, HEAVY BOMBERS ARE A CATEGORY OF WEAPONS DISTINCT FROM MISSILES, MIRV'ED OR UNMIRV'ED, AND WOULD HAVE TO BE SO CONSIDERED IN ANY AGREEMENT.

28. FINALLY, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS STATED FOR THE FIRST TIME, ALBEIT IN A CAREFULLY HEDGED MANNER, "THAT PROVISIONS FOR SOME REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CAN BE INCLUDED IN A NEW AGREEMENT." THE MAGNITUDE OF THE REDUCTIONS AND THE TYPES OF SYSTEMS INVOLVED HAVE BEEN LEFT OPEN, HOWEVER, AND REDUCTIONS WOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF "THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSABILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE," I.E., WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE SOVIET POSITION ON FBS, ALLIED FORCES, GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS, ETC.

29. THIS CONCLUDES MY FORMAL PRESENTATION. I WILL BE GLAD TO RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS.

UNQUOTE

JOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

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